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Introduction 
Foundation-stone of every normative system rests in eligibility of its subjects to bear 
consequences of their own unlawful conduct. International law is not an exception. Last 
60 years of unprecedented development in the area of public international law had 
repercussions also in the field of secondary (responsibility) norms, that is true both in 
quantitative and qualitative way. On the one hand, there are international rules 
addressed to individuals and international organizations, on the other, specific regime 
of aggravated state responsibility for serious violations of peremptory norms was 
introduced. Inevitable consequence of this progression is that state is no longer the only 
entity, which can be held responsible for unlawful conduct under international law. 
Presented analysis deliberately excludes international organizations from its scope, 
especially because codification process in International Law Commission (ILC) is still 
ongoing and state/organization responsibility relation seems to be qualified as exclusive 
one,1 and limits itself to the relation between state and individual responsibility which 
is more complex. 
Current international law is called up to solve “special unlawful situation”,2 where 
identical conduct activates parallel legal consequences both in the province of state and 
individual responsibility. The axiomatic situation of presented thesis can be construed 
very simply: if individual acting as state organ, whose conduct is therefore fully 
attributable to his home-state, perpetrates international crime, his unlawful performance 
gives rise not only to his own individual criminal liability, but initiates as well 
aggravated state responsibility for serious violation of peremptory norms of 
international law. It is evidenced by concurrent legal proceedings before interstate court 
                                                 
1
 DARIO art 6 – compare relevant case law: Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 
Al-Saadon and Mufhdi v. the United Kingdom, Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Al-Skeini v. the United 
Kingdom 
2
 David (1988) p. 72 
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(International Court of Justice – ICJ) and criminal tribunal (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – ICTY) which pertain to identical factual situation 
– genocide in Srebrenica. This duality of responsibility regimes is described by ICJ as 
“constant feature of international law.”3  
Much has been written about either state responsibility or individual criminal 
responsibility as such, but mutual relation between both regimes came to the attention 
of doctrine only in the last decade.4 The gist of presented master thesis is to analyze 
exactly the inosculation of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes 
and state responsibility for serious violations of peremptory norms of international law, 
which has been formerly titled as international crimes of states. For more coherent 
analysis master thesis will be focused only on one category of crimes, namely the crime 
of genocide. This option is motivated by the fact that the crime of genocide as 
compared to other categories of international crimes is relatively best elaborated both in 
theory and practice of ILC and (interstate and criminal) international tribunals. The 
starting point of presented thesis which attracts doctrinal attention is the fact that “all 
aspects of relationship between State responsibility for any internationally wrongful 
acts, including international crimes, and the personal criminal responsibility of 
individual acting as State organs, are not as yet clear.”5 Similarly, P.-M. Dupuy speaks 
in this context about “shadow areas”.6 It is author's modest wish to contribute at least 
marginally to ongoing debate about the topic. 
The structure of master thesis which seeks to explore the issue from broader 
perspective is consequent. In introductory part (Basic Delimitation) methods used for 
establishment of aggravated state responsibility are defined for purposes of master 
thesis. The focus is given on two different approaches adopted by international bodies 
when considering state responsibility for serious violation of international law, because 
                                                 
3
 Bosnia and Hercegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, § 173 – here referred as Genocide Case 
4
 To this day the only coherent treatise on mutual relation between state and individual responsibility is work 
by B. Bonafé The Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (2009) 
5
 Degan (2001) p. 204  
6
 Dupuy (2002) p. 1098 
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they reveal diverse possibility how to perceive mutual relation between both regimes of 
responsibility. First, there is ICJ approach adopted in Genocide Case which puts 
emphasis on the conduct of concrete state organs, with pivotal role played by dolus 
specialis. On the other hand, another method can be distinguished in decisions of Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) (e.g. Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, 
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, La Cantuta v. Peru)7 and in report of International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), where dolus specialis is suppressed in favor 
of state policy requirement, which completely separates both regimes of responsibility 
from the very beginning. 
Next part (Theoretical Delimitation) analyzes doctrinal approaches toward relation of 
state and individual responsibility. To the knowledge of author, at least four possible 
models can be distinguished: monistic model focused on states as the only legal 
subjects of international law (here individual criminal responsibility is defined as form 
of state responsibility);8 dualistic model which is predominant in current legal doctrine 
(here state and individual responsibility are different institutes which do not exclude but 
complement one another);9 accessory model, where individual criminal responsibility is 
perceived as separate regime which is nevertheless dependant on previous conclusion 
about state responsibility;10 and vice versa model, where individual responsibility is 
perceived like separate regime upon which state responsibility is made dependent.11 
In the following part (Role of International Law Commission), codification effort of 
ILC is analyzed. Here, the special focus is given on disciplinary and penal actions 
against individuals as possible form of state responsibility. The major question is, 
whether penal action is part of primary or secondary norms of international law.  
                                                 
7
 Cases before IACHR do not concern state responsibility for genocide, but state responsibility for serious 
violation of international law in general.    
8
 Maison (2004) 
9
 Cançado Trindade (2005) p. 255 
10
 This approach is applicable in relation to the crime of aggression and in certain circumstances to the war 
crimes – compare Wilmshurst (2001) p. 93 and Zimmermann (2007) p. 219  
11
 Gaeta (2007) pp. 645-46 
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Next chapter describes personal and material prerequisite of concurrence between 
state and individual responsibility for crime of genocide. It is clear that concurrence is 
possible only in situations, where wrongful act is committed by person, whose conduct 
can be attributed to the state. The position of genocide perpetrator is therefore analyzed 
– e.g. according to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention), genocide can be committed even by private 
individuals, which shapes the final “visage” of mutual relation between both 
responsibility regimes – ICTY jurisprudence12 is of the importance here. Next, issue of 
capacity in which international crimes are committed by state organs is reflected. 
Problematic Arrest Warrant Case enables conclusion that international crimes are 
committed in private capacity, which would make concurrence between state and 
individual responsibility impossible.13 Next, concurrence between state and individual 
responsibility in proper sense of the word is meaningful only where identical duties are 
prescribed for state and individual by international law (prerequisite ratione materiae). 
The content of primary norms is therefore analyzed. The crucial question is whether 
Genocide Convention was rightly interpreted by ICJ as including duty not to commit 
genocide – the role of customary international law is mentioned as well. As far as 
primary norms are concerned, last issue to be focused on is mens rea in international 
criminal law and fault in the law of state responsibility with special emphasis on dolus 
specialis requirement with respect to the crime of genocide. It remains to be seen, 
whether state and individual responsibility reveal some point of contact as far as 
psychological element is concerned. In the last part of master thesis, conclusions are 
summarized. 
Definition of basic notions 
Before proper analysis is conducted, it is appropriate to briefly define basic 
framework and concepts used within work as to enhance its consistency and prevent 
potential misunderstanding. Master thesis compares state and individual responsibility 
                                                 
12
 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, §§ 100-101 
13
 Spinedi (2002) p. 895 
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for international crimes. The notion of international crime is used here as abbreviation 
and umbrella term for serious violation of international law committed both by 
individual and/or state. It therefore encompasses crimes under international law 
committed by individuals14 and international crimes stricto senso contained in ex-
Article 19 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (DASR).15 This solution is practical since it escapes usage of current terminology 
under DASR Article 40 (serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory 
norms of general international law), traditionally described as “twin brother”16 of 
previous concept under ex-Article 19. The term ‘serious breaches of obligations arising 
under peremptory norms of general international law’ is used only to remove repetition 
of wording ‘international crimes’ and refers strictly to the branch of state responsibility. 
Occasional appearance of the term ‘crimes under international law’ on the other hand 
relates only to the criminal responsibility of individual.    
In accordance with opinion of international theory and practice, state responsibility is 
envisaged here as legal institute, which is “neither civil, nor penal, but simply 
international”.17 State responsibility is connected only with reparation of damages and 
in no way implies punishment of the state.18 The term aggravated state responsibility is 
given the same meaning as state responsibility for international crimes, which 
distinguishes it from ordinary state responsibility connected with less serious violations 
of international law. On the other hand, responsibility of individual is defined in strictly 
criminal sense, without any reference to its potential civil character which may be 
found in some domestic legal orders.19 It is clear that despite sharing of the same goal 
                                                 
14
 Nürnberg Principles Principle I 
15
 Spinedi (1989) p. 138. DASR Article 19 (2) defined international crime as an internationally wrongful act 
which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that 
community as a whole. 
16
 Wyler (2002) p. 1147 
17
 Pellet (2006) p. 4 
18
 Cassese (2003) p. 19 
19
 Murphy (1999) p. 28 
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(i.e. implementation of international law),20 state and individual responsibility are based 
on different material and procedural rules which in sum create totally dissimilar 
mechanisms to achieve this common objective. 
Master thesis focuses on genocide, which is generally defined in accordance with 
Article II of Genocide Convention as any act committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Concurrence between 
state and individual responsibility for crime of genocide in international law is taken for 
granted and need not be further demonstrated. It is enough to mention e.g. ICTY Statute 
Article 4, ICC Statute Article 6 in the area of international criminal law and Genocide 
Convention or DASR Article 40 (ILC commentary) in the area of state responsibility. 
State responsibility for genocide is approached as archetypal case of aggravated state 
responsibility.21 It is recognized both in the original version of DASR and its final 
version adopted in the second reading.22 Contrary to other categories of international 
crimes (e.g. war crimes or crimes against humanity) genocide similarly with aggression 
requires intentional violation on a large scale and thus constitutes serious violation of 
international law per se.23 Commission of genocide therefore initiates concurrence 
between individual criminal responsibility and aggravated state responsibility. 
                                                 
20
 Werle (2005) p. 35 
21
 YILC 1976, Vol. 2, Part Two, p. 121, § 70.  
22
 YILC 2001, Vol. 2, Part Two, p. 112, § 4 
23
 Ibid, p. 113, § 8 
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1 Basic Delimitation 
1.1 Conflicting methods 
Presented master thesis focuses on concurrence between state and individual 
responsibility for international crimes, namely for crime of genocide. Current 
international practice in principle distinguishes two antagonistic methodologies how to 
assess state responsibility for international crimes, which consequently determines 
mutual relationship between both responsibility regimes. These methods are mentioned 
at the very outset of master thesis, because adoption of the first or second one 
fundamentally influences mutual link as between state and individual responsibility. 
Under the classical scheme, if there is a serious violation of international obligations 
under peremptory norms of international law (objective element), competent tribunal 
consequently makes inquiry whether this conduct can be attributed to the state 
(subjective element) – this approach does not differ from the establishment of 
responsibility in other areas of international law, even in situations of less serious 
violation of international obligations (previously labeled as international delicts), it can 
therefore be titled as classical scheme.24 There is conduct of individual (state organ) in 
the centre of international wrongful act, which puts individualization otherwise 
characteristic for international criminal law into the regime of state responsibility. If 
unlawful act of individual, whose conduct is attributable to the state fulfils elements of 
international crimes (e.g. genocide), state responsibility is without any further ado 
established. A. Chouliras points to the conclusion that “individual criminal 
responsibility for genocide becomes a sort of prerequisite of state responsibility.”25 
Model case, where classical approach can be demonstrated is Genocide Case. 
                                                 
24
 DASR art 2, art 40 
25
 Chouliras (2010) p. 207 
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According to the ICJ judgment, a state is responsible for genocide or any of the other 
acts listed in Article III of the Genocide Convention where these are committed by 
persons or organs whose conduct is attributable to the Respondent.26 ICJ method how 
to establish state responsibility in situation of breach of peremptory norms under 
international law does not differ e.g. from violation of obligations in the area of 
diplomatic or consular law – as ICJ puts it, rules for attributing of internationally 
wrongful act do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act, which reflects the state of 
customary international law.27 In hypothetical situation, under current approach, the 
conduct of even very small group of state organs is capable to give rise to state 
responsibility for serious violation of peremptory norms under international law.    
Second approach, derived from sociological studies of organizations, rejects above 
mentioned axioms of classical method.28 Basic assumption can be formulated 
consequently: gist of organization (e.g. of the state) act is derived not from an 
individual conduct, but from the organizational goal which is pursued. State is defined 
not as mere sum of individuals but as autonomous entity acting independently on will 
or intent of concrete persons. Individual conduct, though accompanied by relevant mens 
rea, need not be identical with goals followed and therefore has to be rejected as basis 
of organization (state) responsibility. Sociological method criticizes classical approach 
because it enables to ground state responsibility even on conduct of few individuals.29 
State responsibility is founded here on state policy which is connected with assigned 
goals. Sociological approach can be described on the work of P. Gaeta. 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, p. 207. Genocide Case, § 471 
27
 Ibid, § 401 
28
 Supra note 25, p. 209. Compare Gross (1969) p. 284   
29
 Supra note 11, p. 636. ILC commentary to DASR ex-Article 19 is of the relevance here (supra note 21, p. 
104, § 21), ILC stated: 
Conversely, as far as the State is concerned, it is not necessarily true that 
any ‘crime under international law’ committed by one of its organs for 
which the perpetrator is held personally liable to punishment, despite his 
capacity as a State organ, must automatically be considered not only as an 
internationally wrongful act of the State concerned, but also as an act 
entailing a ‘special form’ of responsibility for that State.  
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Gaeta asserts that the fact of concurrence between individual criminal responsibility 
and state responsibility for international crimes in itself does not mean that crimes 
under international law are identical with state international crimes and consequently 
demonstrates this presumption on the case of genocide. Genocide like crime under 
international law requires dolus specialis (the intent to destroy protected group as such), 
on the other hand for state responsibility to arise, the existence of state policy aiming at 
destruction of protected group is required.30 As far as state responsibility for genocide 
is concerned, there is no need to find out dolus specialis, which is very practical from 
the perspective of tricky theoretical question where to locate adequate “state fault”.31 
Gaeta comes to the conclusion that only by adoption of sociological approach real 
duality of responsibility in international law can be maintained, duality which separates 
state and individual responsibility for serious violations of international law.32 
Above mentioned method can be traced even in findings of ICID. Security Council 
resolution 1564 (2004) gave Commission mandate to investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties and to 
determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred.33 ICID concluded that 
Sudanese government is responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law amounting to the level of crimes under international 
law.34 With respect to genocide ICID came to the negative conclusion, because “the 
Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.”35 At the same time 
                                                 
30
 Supra note 11, p. 643 
31
 Some scholars explicitly demand adequate mens rea of prominent political leaders as prerequsite for state 
responsibility. Compare Schabas (2000) p. 444 
32
 Supra note 11, pp. 643-44 
33
 ICID Report, p. 2 
34
 Ibid, p. 3 
35
 Ibid, p. 4. Relevance of state policy with respect to state responsiblity for genocide has been confirmed 
even by ILC when it dealt with issue of composite acts: “Even though it has special features, the prohibition 
of genocide, formulated in identical terms in the 1948 Convention and in later instruments, may be taken as 
an illustration of a composite obligation. It implies that the responsible entity (including a State) will have 
adopted a systematic policy or practice.” Supra note 22, p. 62, § 3 
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ICID admitted that in particular cases individuals, including government officials, 
could have acted with genocide intent. From the brief outline it is clear that conduct of 
concrete state organ was not important for ICID findings, it was only general policy 
pursued which was counted. 
The same attitude can be distinguished in decision-practice of IACHR which is, 
especially during last decade, often confronted with situations of serious violations of 
human rights resulting in acknowledgment of aggravated state responsibility.36 Despite 
non-uniform terminology used by IACHR (aggravated responsibility, aggravated 
sufferings, aggravated effect) some common features can be distinguished in its 
practice. First and foremost, it is the existence of state plan, policy or pattern of similar 
conduct, which subsumes IACHR decisions under the heading of sociological 
approach. In Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala aggravated responsibility was based not 
on concrete conduct of state agents (murder of Myrna Mack-Chang), but on “pattern of 
selective extra-legal executions fostered by the State, which was directed against those 
individuals who were considered “internal enemies.”37 Similarly, in Plan de Sanchéz 
Massacre v. Guatemala, Court concluded that bloodshed in Plan de Sanchéz village 
was part of governmental policy tierra arasada ranged against aboriginal Maya 
communities.38 In these situations, according to B. Bonafé, IACHR awards judgments 
about aggravated responsibility without being directly ask to do so.39 Nevertheless, 
individual complaints are set in wider context of state policy, which enables to fulfill 
criterion of seriousness inevitable for establishment of aggravated state responsibility. 
Final shape of mutual relationship between individual and state responsibility in 
international law is highly influenced by acceptance of the first or second method 
described above. Under classical model, the linkage is much closer, because it is 
individual conduct which is in the heart of state conduct as opposed to the requirement 
of state policy under second model, which leads to complete separation of both 
                                                 
36
 Supra note 7 
37
 Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, § 139 
38
 Plan de Sanchéz v. Guatemala, § 51 
39
 Supra note 4, p. 79 
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responsibility regimes. Despite the promulgation of latter method at international scene, 
authoritative decision of ICJ hints that it is classical approach which is preferred under 
international law de lege lata. In Genocide Case, ICJ considered the existence of 
general plan or pattern only as potential evidence of genocidal intent, it did not require 
it in any manner as condition sine qua non included in the genocide definition.40 This 
outcome is preferable not only for purposes of presented thesis, as it facilitates further 
evaluation of reciprocal link, but as well from standpoint of consistency in international 
law – as ILC puts it, nature of obligation breached can not alter rules of attribution 
under customary rules of state responsibility. This approach leads to coherent 
application of these rules in all situations of unlawful state conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Genocide Case, § 373. Similar conclusion can be found in decision practice of ICTY. In Jelisic Case Trial 
Chamber ruled that “the drafters of the Convention did not deem the existence of an organization or a system 
serving a genocidal objective as a legal ingredient of the crime. In so doing, they did not discount the 
possibility of a lone individual seeking to destroy a group as such.” Prosecutor v. Jelisic, § 100 
  12
 
2 Theoretical Delimitation  
Mutual relationship between state and individual responsibility for international 
crimes has been coming to the attention of international doctrine from various reasons 
over time. Early era, confronted with foundation of the first international criminal 
tribunals, had to substantiate the very existence of individual as separate legal person in 
international law.41 Next period, marked by introduction of international crimes of 
states, had to evaluate their link to the well established categories of crimes under 
international law. Finally, current increased doctrinal interest in the field can be 
reasoned by concurrent legal proceedings at international scene concerning state and 
individual responsibility for international crimes. Generalization of doctrinal debate 
enables to distinguish four theoretical models of mutual relationship between both 
responsibility regimes – as it shall be seen, except of one model they all are applicable 
to the crime of genocide as well.  
2.1  Monistic model 
Monistic approach is based on assumption that individual criminal responsibility 
constitutes mere form of state responsibility - the only legal entity facing responsibility 
in international law is state.42 Individual criminal responsibility is here absorbed into 
state responsibility. A. Nollkaemper adverts to the “invisibility of individual in the 
traditional law of state responsibility”,43 which means that unlawful act of individual in 
position of state organ was attributed only to his mother state. Penal action against 
individual performed at domestic level was considered as satisfaction by which mother 
                                                 
41
 Similarly Nollkaemper (2003), Bonafé (2005), Franck (2007), Jørgensen (2000), Dupuy (2002) 
42
 Monism/dualism dichotomy is used by M. Starita, compare Starita (2000) p. 104  
43
 Nollkaemper (2003) p. 617 
  13
state realized its own obligation of reparation.44 Sanction against individual was 
prerogative of mother state that means all other members of international community 
were excluded from sanctioning by reference to traditional international legal axiom 
pars in parem non habet iurisdictionem. Protagonists of monistic approach later 
postulated rule, according to which serious violation of international law implicated 
breach of otherwise inviolable principle of sovereign equality of states – lack of mother 
state action activated right (not duty) of all other states to initiate penal proceedings 
against foreign state organs.45 
Monistic approach is built on the basis of traditional international law with states as 
only legal person of whole system. It is connected mostly with works from the middle 
of 20th century.46 References to monism can nevertheless be traced in the last decade as 
well. R. Maison in her work from 2004 advocates monistic approach even in the light 
of unprecedented evolution in the field of international criminal law – in her opinion 
international criminal tribunals, which act in the name of international community as a 
whole, constitute tools of centralized repression which only replace duty of mother state 
and right of all other state to initiate penal action against individual.47 Monistic 
approach can be detected both in primary norms (obligation to criminalize certain 
unlawful conduct)48 and secondary norms (punishment of individual as form of 
satisfaction)49 addressed to and adherent with the state.    
2.2  Dualistic model 
Dualistic model represents prevailing opinion on parallel existence of state and 
individual responsibility in international law. Both regimes are embraced as separate 
institutes which complement (i.e. not exclude) one another.50 When compared to 
                                                 
44
 Supra note 4, pp. 52-53  
45
 Supra note 2, p. 80 
46
 Supra note 4, pp. 54-57 
47
 Supra note 8, pp. 10-11   
48
 Genocide Convention art I, art V 
49
 Compare Chapter 3 
50
 Supra note 9, p. 255  
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monism, dualistic approach is based on exactly antipodal presumptions: legal 
personality of individual is taken as self-evident,51 activity of international tribunals is 
not construed as sanction against state and finally punishment of individual is not taken 
as part of state secondary obligations.52 Although common goal is usually highlighted 
(suppression of international criminality), it is clear that both responsibility regimes are 
based on different material and procedural rules53 which reveal their unlikeness – state 
responsibility holds its reparative nature,54 on the other hand individual responsibility 
has typically criminal character with mens rea as cornerstone of whole discipline. 
Individual responsibility is responsibility for international crimes, on the other hand 
state responsibility pertains to international wrongful acts.  
Despite various distinctions between both responsibility regimes, protagonists of 
dualism admit that “some degree of overlap may occur.”55 As far as genocide is 
concerned, intent forms part of primary rule prohibiting genocide and is therefore 
relevant within the system of state responsibility as well. It is obvious that intent like 
psychological element can be connected only with acts of individuals, in this case state 
agents, to trigger state responsibility.56 Dualistic approach nevertheless rejects opinion 
that conclusion about state responsibility is formally dependant on previous conclusion 
about criminal responsibility of individual (compare vice versa model) – if previous 
criminal decision is available, it can be used most highly for evidentiary purposes, but it 
can not in any way predetermine the outcome of interstate proceedings.57 Put it briefly, 
both responsibility regimes are independent, separated and do not influence conclusions 
                                                 
51
 Lauterpacht (1968) p. 40 
52
 According to A. Zimmermann, duty to punish perpetrators of crimes under international law is part of 
primary norms, compare Zimmermann (2009) pp. 304-5 
53
 Supra note 6, p. 1094 
54
 The idea of punitive dimension of state responsibility was persuasively rejected both in theory and practice. 
Supra note 17, p. 4. Compare Genocide Case, § 178 
55
 Bianchi (2009) p. 18 
56
 Ibid, p. 18 
57
 Asunción (2009) pp. 1208-9  
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adopted in the other area of international law.58 Formal dependency of state and 
individual responsibility was pointed out by Serbia in proceedings before ICJ. Serbia 
presented argument that “the condition sine qua non for establishing State responsibility is 
the prior establishment, according to the rules of criminal law, of the individual responsibility 
of a perpetrator engaging the State’s responsibility.”59 ICJ promptly rejected this line of 
argumentation, according to the court any other interpretation would enable situations, 
where hiding of responsible individuals before criminal justice spills over to the other 
branch of international law, namely to the law of state responsibility.60   
2.3  Accessory model 
 Accessory model treats individual criminal responsibility as category flowing 
directly from rules of international law (i.e. not resulting only from state obligations as 
monism contends), but at the same time makes its realization dependant on previous 
conclusion about state responsibility. Applicability of this model is nevertheless limited 
to war crimes61 and crime of aggression, which is based on axiom “no State 
responsibility for an act of aggression, no crime of aggression by an individual.”62 
Theory of state and individual responsibility does not apply this approach to the crime 
of genocide, there is therefore no need dwell on it in bigger details. 
2.4 Vice versa model 
Last model abstracted from international theory (and practice) is regular reflection of 
previous accessory approach. Here, individual criminal responsibility is treated as 
separate regime (i.e. not as monistic form of state responsibility) which is highlighted 
by the assumption that state responsibility for international crimes is formally made 
dependant on previous conclusion about individual criminal responsibility. The 
                                                 
58
 Supra note 43, p. 628 
59
 Genocide Case, § 180 
60
 Ibid, § 182 
61
 Zimmermann (2007) p. 217 – Zimmermann points to the importance of reprisals in international criminal 
law. Compare Cassese (2008) p. 255 
62
 Wilmshurst (2001) p. 93 
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arguments of this school of thoughts were echoed in declaration of Judge Skotnikov 
annexed to Genocide Case judgment – according to Skotnikov, ICJ as interstate 
tribunal has exceeded its powers, when it admitted that “it can itself make a 
determination as to whether or not genocide was committed without a distinct decision 
by a court or tribunal exercising criminal jurisdiction.”63 Similarly, D. Groome argues, 
that “ICJ should and must wait until such final [criminal] judgments are rendered 
before it commences its work on the merits.”64 Groome contends that ICJ has no 
competence in criminal matters and by reserving it (§ 181 Genocide Case judgment), 
ICJ points to in absentia trial without adequate guarantees provided in criminal 
proceedings.65  
As relevant presented arguments are, it can be concluded that dominant doctrinal 
opinion is identified with traditional dualistic approach which accepts certain overlap 
between both responsibility regimes, but at the same time rejects idea of formalized 
mutual dependency otherwise typical for accessory model and its regular reflection in 
vice versa model. The foundation of state conduct rests in behavior of individual acting 
as state agents, but it can not act as factor of de iure subservience between both regimes 
– here, state organ conduct has relevance only for fulfillment of objective and 
subjective element within the state responsibility for wrongful act, it has no connotation 
as far as criminal guilt and individual criminal punishment are concerned.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
 Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, p. 6 
64
 Groome (2008) pp. 985-86 
65
 Ibid, p. 986. Similarly supra note 11, pp. 645-46 
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3 Role of International Law Commission 
Concurrence between state and individual responsibility was vividly discussed within 
ILC during codification works on state responsibility for wrongful acts and individual 
criminal responsibility for crimes against the peace and security of mankind. It is 
therefore logical to at least briefly summarize ILC position towards the matter. As it is 
well known, codification effort led in adoption of two important documents, namely 
DASR (2001) and Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(1996) – (Code). Both documents contain provision expressly defining their scope 
which differentiates them from responsibility rules applicable towards individual or 
state respectively. 
 Without prejudice clause in DASR (Article 58) states that “these articles are without 
prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any 
person acting on behalf of a State.” Identical wording is used in Code as well, its 
Article 4 stipulates that “the fact that the present Code provides for the responsibility of 
individuals for crimes against the peace and security of mankind is without prejudice to 
any question of the responsibility of States under international law.” Commentaries of 
both codification outcomes reveal that ILC highlighted non-exclusive character of state 
and individual responsibility (without prejudice clause)66 and principal distinction 
existing between them.67 Concurrence between state and individual responsibility is 
claimed by ILC as matter of fact, nevertheless there is no detail analysis of mutual 
relationship between both regimes contained anywhere in presented drafts. Such 
attitude is of no surprise as any other solution would obstruct finalization of 
codification works. Next section seeks to explore signs of contact between both regimes 
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as they were presented during discussions in ILC – these opinions are relevant with 
respect to crime of genocide as well. 
3.1 Codification of state responsibility 
Very soon after adoption of state responsibility on the list of topics considered by 
ILC, the crucial question of a role the prosecution of individual state organs will play 
within the system of state responsibility was presented. It was necessary to establish, 
whether penalization of individuals should be capable to exhaust reparatory obligation 
of states and whether criminal sanctions towards guilty state organs should be treated as 
part of primary or secondary state obligations.68 First rapporteur on the topic of state 
responsibility, F.V. García-Amador, in his original report accepted punitive character of 
state responsibility.69 García-Amador distinguished between ordinary wrongful act and 
punishable act (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression) with punitive 
dimension. He smartly resolved impossibility of imposing criminal sanctions against 
state (societas delinquere non potest) as punishment was limited only to individuals in 
position of state organs.70 Criminal sanction against individual thus formed part of 
secondary state obligation. 
This conception was strictly rejected by R. Ago, who became special rapporteur in 
1963. Ago in his fifth report from 1976 argued that punishment of individuals, whose 
conduct initiated state responsibility can not be defined as special form of state 
responsibility, because there are manifest distinctions between both responsibility 
regimes.71 According to Ago, adverse consequences of illegal act could not be 
transferred from one legal entity to another. 
Final stage of DASR codification process revealed this question with new intensity. 
Position of prosecution and punishment of individual within the system of state 
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responsibility was connected with DASR Article 45 (satisfaction) adopted in the first 
reading, which according to G. Hafner presented “thorniest [part] of the draft 
articles”.72 J. Crawford, last special rapporteur, impugned ex-Art 45 as he pointed to the 
fact that it is not clear whether punishment of individuals is connected with primary or 
secondary obligations. He nevertheless retained this form of satisfaction in draft 
presented to drafting committee and recommended only slight change in wording which 
would better correspond with division of state power and independence of judiciary – 
penal action instead of punishment.    
Very inspirational are even other presented comments. A. Pellet concluded that “it 
would have been instructive to draw a parallel between “the serious misconduct of 
officials or … the criminal conduct of any person” and article 19, on crimes, and to 
examine the possible relationship between the two —or three—concepts involved.”73 
Regrettably, no such analyze has ever been conducted, and finally opinion which 
rejected any connection between state responsibility and punishment of individuals 
prevailed.74 In the light of this substantial critics statement of G. Gaja, at that time 
chairman of drafting committee, is of no surprise: “Given the divergent views on this 
issue and also the fact that paragraph 2 does not intend to provide an exhaustive list, the 
Committee decided not to mention disciplinary or penal action in the text.”75 Opinion 
of drafting committee shaped final wording of current Article 37 (satisfaction), which 
refers only to acknowledgment of the breach, regret, apology or another appropriate 
modality. 
Explicit inclusion of prosecution and punishment of state organs among forms of 
satisfaction would lead to more concrete interlacing between state and individual 
responsibility. On the other hand, such solution would open the door for potential 
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transfer of responsibility which ILC explicitly rejected.76 It can be concluded that 
questions connected with individual entirely disappeared from DASR second version or 
were at least substantially marginalized.77 ILC preferred understanding of criminal 
actions against individuals as part of primary obligations, which can be demonstrated 
on Genocide Convention.78 Finally, this conclusion was confirmed even by ICJ in 
Genocide Case79 – obligation to punish genocide is not a consequence of a state organ 
previous commission of genocide, i.e. non-punishment of perpetrators is regarded as 
separate violation of international law. 
3.2 Codification of individual responsibility 
Mutual link between state and individual responsibility was discussed even during 
works on the Code – here, the issue was connected with the question of perpetrators of 
crimes against the peace and security of mankind. In the 1950s ILC came to the 
conclusion that perpetrators of crimes can only be individuals.80 D. Thiam report from 
1983 which opened door for potential penal state responsibility and proposed the 
interconnection between crimes against the peace and security of mankind on the one 
hand and international crimes of the state on the other (definition of first category 
should have been derived from DASR ex-Article 19) was therefore somewhat 
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astonishing.81 ILC repelled this variant even in embryonic phase – ratione personae 
scope of the Code should have been limited only to individuals for future.82 
Any linkage towards state was consequently limited by adoption of approach 
according to which international crimes can be committed not only by state authorities 
but as well by private individuals.83 Definite separation of state and individual 
responsibility was achieved by rejection of idea that crimes against the peace should be 
defined through international crimes of state84 – criticism can be summarized as 
follows: 
a) general definition of crimes against the peace and security of mankind is needless, it 
was not contained even in ILC works on the topic from 1950s 
b) international crime of state is broader term, which should not be used for purpose of 
definition of narrower term 
c) international crime of state as enfant terrible concept strongly opposed by many 
authorities should not be spread to other areas of international law 
d) state and individual responsibility are two distinct institutes giving rise to different 
consequences – briefly, definition of penal institute can not be derived from extra-
penal (civilian) institute.85  
ILC rejected any conceptual links between state and individual responsibility and 
emphasized their dissimilarity. Article 4 included in final version of Code can be 
interpreted as rational evaluation of reality (i.e. existence of dual responsibility in 
international law) and sui generis safety-clause, which is best reflected in comment 
presented by Belgium.86 As pointed out above, one can only complain, ILC did not 
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analyze mutual relation between state and individual responsibility regimes in more 
details and managed with superficial enunciation of their simultaneous existence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
because of its failure to act or its own improvidence. It therefore seems 
unusual that State responsibility should not have been dealt with in the 
Code. It should also be noted that inclusion of State responsibility in the 
Code would make it possible to provide a sound juridical basis for the 
granting of compensation to the victims of crimes and other eligible 
parties. 
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4 Concurrence Prerequisites 
4.1 Prerequisites ratione personae 
 Next chapter shall analyze questions connected with position of genocide 
perpetrator, which considerably influence mutual relation between state and individual 
responsibility - they are therefore denominated as concurrence prerequisites ratione 
personae. As the concurrence of responsibilities is possible only in situation, where 
wrongful act is committed by person, whose conduct is attributable to the state, the 
position of perpetrator is evaluated first of all - as it shall be seen, current lex lata is 
quite clear in this issue. Next, controversial ICJ decision in Arrest Warrant Case which 
enables conclusion that international crimes by public authorities are committed in 
private capacity is examined and critically reviewed. Prerequisites ratione personae are 
fulfilled, where the perpetrator of genocide is state organ, whose acts are adopted in 
public capacity. Any other outcome would make establishment of direct state 
responsibility impossible. If genocide is committed by private individual, respectively 
in private capacity of state organ, one can speak mostly about concurrence between 
individual criminal responsibility and indirect state responsibility.  
 By private individual any person who does not show any link (formal or factual) to 
the state is meant. The individual acting e.g. on the instructions of the state or under its 
effective direction or control is therefore understood here as de facto state organ whose 
conduct can without any doubt establish direct state responsibility.87 On the other hand, 
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as far as private individual in proper sense of the word is concerned, the state is 
responsible only for failure to prevent and repress his conduct. “The basis of 
responsibility here is not the attribution to the State of the acts of the individuals; it is 
the failure by the State as an entity to comply with the obligations of prevention and 
prosecution incumbent on it.”88 To use terminology adherent to human rights, one can 
speak about state positive obligations.89 The concurrence between negative obligations 
(here duty not to commit genocide) is hence feasible only where international crime is 
committed by state organ in his public capacity. Moreover, indirect state responsibility 
can hardly fulfill criteria of aggravated state responsibility which require gross or 
systematic violation of cogent international norms. Even if obligation to prevent and 
repress genocide is defined as part of ius cogens,90 it is hardly imaginable that 
seriousness standard would be established. 
4.1.1 Position of perpetrator 
Theory and practice of international law generally agree that international crimes 
can be committed even by private individuals. At the same time the reality of most 
conflicts reveal that such crimes are usually perpetrated (or at least acquiesced) by state 
organs as integral part of criminal state policy.91 Close tie to the state was evident in the 
early era of individual criminal responsibility – e.g. Article 6 of Charter of International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) established jurisdiction only over persons who acted in the 
interest of European Axis countries. IMT hence covered only unlawful conduct of de 
iure or de facto state organs.92 Latter international tribunals do not explicitly require 
official position of perpetrator, they instead stress the character of unlawful conduct – 
e.g. according to the Rome Statute ICC shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
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over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.93 This general 
position is valid as well in relation to genocide. 
Article IV of Genocide Convention unambiguously states that “[p]ersons 
committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals.”94 Most cases before ad hoc tribunals covered crimes committed by public 
officials, on the other hand lack of such status can not pose as a bar for criminal 
proceedings, the doors are opened even for prosecution of private individuals – to give 
example related to the genocide, famous Media Case held before ICTR can be 
mentioned.95 Any link to the state is further diminished by explicit refusal of state 
policy as discrete element of genocide. State plan or policy is not legal ingredient of the 
crime, although the existence of such policy can help to establish that accused held 
required dolus specialis.96 Briefly, genocidal policy can be used as indirect evidence of 
mens rea.  
4.1.2 International crimes - private or public capacity? 
Despite theoretical possibility of genocide perpetration by private individual, typical 
wrong-doer remains an individual holding an office within the state system. It is 
therefore necessary to establish, whether international crimes when committed by state 
organs are manifestation of private or public capacity. If international crimes are 
committed in private capacity, situation would be somewhat similar to school-book 
example of crime passionel97 – here, state would be responsible mostly for failure to 
exercise due diligence, but definitely not for murder. The motive of long-standing 
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debates, which still can not be regarded as definitively settled, is judgment rendered by 
ICJ in 2002 in so-called Arrest Warrant Case.98  
Factual background can be summarized as follows. In the year 2000 Belgian court 
issued arrest warrant against Congolese incumbent foreign minister for grave breaches 
of Geneva Conventions and for crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated before he 
took the office. Democratic Republic of Congo claimed that conduct of Belgium 
violated international law, namely “the principle that a State may not exercise [its 
authority] on the territory of another State and of the principle of sovereign equality 
among all Members of the United Nations”99 and “the diplomatic immunity of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State”.100 Two years later, ICJ decided in 
favor of Congo with overwhelming majority 13:3 – the decision was based on absolute 
character of immunities ratione personae before foreign domestic courts, which is 
without any doubt norm arising from customary international law.101 ICJ ruled that in 
certain circumstances personal immunity does not represent a bar to criminal 
prosecution and gave following examples. Incumbent state officials can be tried before 
own domestic courts, they can be tried even abroad, if state they represent decides to 
waive their immunity and finally, they can be tried before international criminal 
tribunal, where immunity ratione personae is not taken into account at all.102  
According to the most controversial part of the judgment, a state organ (generally 
speaking) can be prosecuted after he leaves his office for crimes committed during the 
period of office in private capacity.103 To use argumentation a contrario, any acts done 
during office in public capacity would have to stay unpunished – as A. Cassese points, 
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international crimes could be prosecuted only if they were regarded as acts done in 
private capacity.104 The pitfalls of judgment were best described by M. Spinedi, who 
concludes that ICJ approach would make establishment of state responsibility for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity entirely impossible.105 The same holds true for 
genocide. Is it hence necessary to resign on the idea of concurrent responsibility of state 
and individual from this reason? Are international crimes committed in private or 
public capacity? 
Proponents of first line of reasoning (private capacity) argue that international 
crimes can not be regarded as official acts, because they are not listed among normal 
state functions.106 On the other hand, massive commission of international crimes is 
hardly imaginable without abuse of powers, which individuals enjoy rightly through 
their official function. “It is primarily through the position and rank they occupy that 
they are in a position to order, instigate or aid and abet or culpably tolerate or condone 
such crimes as genocide or crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.”107 The doctrine and practice of international law is divided between 
those, who stress that interpretation of international law can not shut the doors for 
establishment of state responsibility (international crimes as acts done in public 
capacity) and those, who deny that international crimes are function of any state organ 
(international crimes as acts done in private capacity).108  
The author of presented master thesis identifies himself with position, according to 
which international crimes are committed in public capacity and presents four grounds 
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supporting his conclusion. First, international law provides for the exception from 
functional immunities which has already attained the status of customary international 
law.109 Generally speaking, functional immunities cover official acts of de iure or de 
facto state organs (act of the state doctrine), which means that these acts are attributed 
only towards the state and can not induce individual responsibility.110 The exception 
from general rule enables conclusion that international crimes are widely recognized as 
official acts which can nevertheless be attributed toward individuals and incur his 
criminal liability at the same time. Blaskic decision implies that it is not necessary to 
substantiate domestic criminal prosecution of international crimes by their private 
character and to circumvent intricately the general rule on functional immunities.111 
Individual is shielded only by immunities ratione personae which, at least as domestic 
level is concerned, have absolute character. 
Second, official character of international crimes was implicitly acknowledged even 
by ICJ in its later case law, the court thus departed from the controversial conclusion in 
Arrest Warrant Case. According to ICJ, state responsibility for genocide in Srebrenica 
could only arise if it was “perpetrated by “persons or entities” having the status of 
organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.112 International crimes perpetrated by 
state organs hence do not exclude state responsibility, i.e. they are not committed in 
private capacity.113 Moreover, when ICJ speaks about existence of dual system of 
responsibility, it uses the logic of constant feature of international law. Conclusion from 
Arrest Warrant Case is strictly contrary to the proposed constancy. 
Third, main argument of private act doctrine rests on impossibility to regard 
commission of international crimes as enforcement of regular state function. This 
argument is rational and must be subscribed to, it need not be nevertheless deduced 
from it that international crimes are committed in private capacity. Exceeding of state 
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organs powers is not a bar for establishment of state responsibility (DASR Article 7), at 
the same time it eliminates the possibility to invoke the act of the state doctrine 
connected with functional immunities.114 International crimes committed by state 
organs are regarded as exemplary case of ultra vires acts, they are prohibited by 
international law, they are in most instances committed with the aid of resources linked 
to the particular official function – they are “carried out by persons cloaked with 
governmental authority”.115 ILC commentary to DASR admits that the problem can 
arise how to distinguish between “unauthorized but still “official” conduct, on the one 
hand, and “private” conduct on the other”,116 which is not attributed to the state, but at 
the same time it clarifies that this is not the case if the conduct in question is massive, 
systematic or recurrent.117 In such situation it is clear that the state knew or should have 
known about unlawful conduct and should have applied preventive and repressive 
measures.118 Briefly, if commission of international crimes is usually widespread and 
systematic, there is no doubt about its official character. The conditions set in DASR 
Article 7 are therefore fulfilled, ultra vires conduct can be attributed to the state and 
simultaneously individual in the position of state organ can not rely on the act of the 
state doctrine, because his conduct was clearly in the breach of domestic law, 
respectively international law. 
Last, if international crimes fall into the category of private acts, it would be 
reasonable to expect that states would use this argument first and foremost as a reason 
to exonerate themselves from international responsibility. Such approach would be in 
stark contradiction to the idea of dual responsibility as “constant feature of international 
law”.119 To the knowledge of the author, this line of reasoning does not appear in 
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international practice. Moreover, there is lack of judicial pronouncements which could 
be used in favor of private act approach – above mentioned Arrest Warrant Case 
contains this conclusion only implicitly, Pinochet Case refers to private acts only in 
minority vote. All these reasons support opinion, according to which international 
crimes when committed by state organs have to be regarded as acts done in official 
capacity. Thus, if genocide is committed by state organ, it can be without difficulties 
attributed to the state.  
4.2 Prerequisites ratione materiae 
Previous part of master thesis elaborated questions connected with position of 
genocide perpetrator, following chapter deals with content of genocide-related norms. 
First, comparison is made between primary norms stipulated by international law 
toward state and individual, later the key aspect of these norms (dolus specialis) is 
evaluated. It shall be seen to what degree one can speak about concurrence between 
state and individual responsibility (identity of primary norms), respectively how far is 
state fault conformable to the intent of individual perpetrator.  
4.2.1 Content of primary norms 
Concurrence between state and individual responsibility in proper sense of the word 
is meaningful only there, where identical duties are prescribed for state and individual 
by international law. Closer look to the content of primary norms as far as genocide is 
concerned is integral part of presented analysis. The crucial question is, whether 
international law provides for identical duties irrespective of its addressee – state or 
individual.  
To begin with individual, there is no doubt that primary norms120 do prohibit 
commission of genocide. Obligations imposed on individuals are nevertheless not 
exhausted by negative duty, civilian and military superiors (commanders) may be held 
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responsible for breach of their positive duty to prevent and repress genocide committed 
by their subordinates.121 Failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent and repress genocide, when military or civilian superior knew or should have 
known about unlawful conduct of his inferiors (primary obligation) therefore 
establishes responsibility (secondary obligation) – it is enough to mention Musema 
Case122 and Kayishema & Ruzindana Case123 held before ICTR where superior 
responsibility was declared. It is of importance that ad hoc tribunals do not require 
existence of dolus specialis for conviction under this form of responsibility.124 Next 
lines shall analyze content of international obligations provided with respect to 
genocide towards state. 
This question was discussed especially during proceedings in Genocide Case. It is 
appropriate to focus firstly on particular international law represented by Genocide 
Convention and consequently on general customary international law as both sources of 
international law need not necessarily lay down the same rules. Genocide Convention 
expressly mentions obligations to prevent and punish genocide (Article I), to enact 
respective domestic regulation (Article V), to prosecute perpetrators of genocide 
(Article VI) and finally obligation to allow extradition (Article VII) – ICJ specified that 
prevention of genocide is obligation “of conduct and not one of result”125 and limited duty to 
repress perpetrators only to territorial states.126 
It is evident that Genocide Convention does not contain explicit command not to 
commit genocide. Bosnia and Herzegovina nevertheless argued in favor of this 
obligation, using provision of Article IX, which establishes ICJ jurisdiction in disputes 
“including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide”, as the starting 
point. ICJ rejected this proposition, it stressed the jurisdictional character of Article IX, 
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but at the same time admitted that the obligation not to commit genocide may flow 
from other substantive provisions of convention.127 At the end, ICJ came to the 
conclusion that duty not to commit genocide is necessarily implied in obligation to 
prevent genocide (argument a minori ad maius), because “it would be paradoxical if 
States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, 
commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were 
not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs.”128 ICJ reading of 
Genocide Convention was not unanimously shared. Dissenting judges highlighted that 
majority opinion leads to decriminalization of genocide which is transformed to mere 
state wrongful act,129 or pointed to the impossibility to deduce the prohibition of 
genocide from its prevention without inextricable perversion of treaty interpretation 
methods as included in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.130 It is suitable to 
dwell on the matter at some length. 
Travaux préparatoires reveal that three different conceptions of relation between 
state and individual responsibility were discussed during conference.131 The United 
States and the Soviet Union regarded future convention as criminal tool and orientated 
themselves on individual criminal responsibility which should have been enforced 
entirely at domestic level. Similar position was maintained by France, with the 
exception that French proposals stressed necessity to establish international tribunal for 
prosecution of individuals as it would have been more effective in achievement of 
assigned goal. On the other hand, the United Kingdom believed that individual 
responsibility is not adequate measure as “it was impossible to blame any particular 
individual for actions for which whole governments or States were responsible.”132 It 
therefore proposed enactment of provision which would expressly mention direct state 
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responsibility for commission of genocide – the UK further admitted that obligation not 
to commit genocide is implied in obligation to prevent it as well.133 At the end, British 
initiative was rejected by margin of only two votes (24 against, 22 in favor), whereas 
the main reason was ambiguous wording interpreted by some states as enabling to make 
conclusion about state criminal responsibility.134 
The content of duties imposed on states by Genocide Convention has been 
subjected to scrutiny both during and after the adoption of convention. Proponents of 
individual oriented approach argue that Genocide Convention is nothing more than a 
treaty on judicial cooperation in criminal matters.135 Cassese asserts that drafters` intent 
results e.g. from preamble which declares that “in order to liberate mankind from such 
an odious scourge, international co-operation is required.”136 Genocide Convention 
similarly like other treaties such as Torture Convention (1984) harmonizes domestic 
legislation and criminalizes specific category of international crime. Gaeta comes to the 
conclusion that ICJ ruling is going contrary to the historical foundation of Genocide 
Convention (Nürnberg legacy of individual criminal responsibility) and contrary to the 
ordinary interpretation methods of international treaties (impossibility to deduce duty 
not to commit genocide from duty to prevent it).137 
On the other hand, proponents of state oriented approach usually argue with above 
mentioned Article IX of Genocide Convention, which speaks about responsibility of a 
state for genocide. Article IX has been analyzed in details by ICJ which accented its 
jurisdictional dimension, but at the same time used it as subsidiary argument for its 
reading of convention.138 ICJ cited its previous decision on jurisdiction (1996) and held 
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that “the reference to Article IX to ‘the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any 
of the other acts enumerated in Article III’, does not exclude any form of State 
responsibility.”139 M. Milanovič140 and J. Quigley141 argue by plain meaning of Article 
IX and add that there is no need to make recourse to the travaux préparatoires because 
such technique is justified only if ordinary meaning of the text is ambiguous. As it is 
seen, both intellectual trends present completely antagonistic but still persuasive 
arguments.  
Finally, brief mention about other forms of responsibility recognized both under law 
of state responsibility and international criminal law should be made - ICJ expressly 
dealt with incitement, conspiracy and especially complicity in genocide. It can be 
summarized that all these categories were treated differently than in the area of 
international criminal law, which does not correspond very well with the substantial 
adherence to ICTY work revealed in the other parts of Genocide Case judgment.142 ICJ 
ruled, without any explanation, that commission of genocide absorbs incitement and 
conspiracy to commit genocide, which conclusion is going contrary to settled 
jurisprudence in international criminal law. Here, both forms are regarded as so-called 
inchoate crimes having autonomous character independent on the commission of 
principal act.143 As for complicity in genocide, ICJ stressed that complicity “always 
requires that some positive action has been taken to furnish aid or assistance to the perpetrators 
of the genocide”144 Case-law of ad-hoc tribunals (Furundžija, Akayesu) nevertheless 
acknowledges complicity even in negative form, i.e. complicity by omission.145 To conclude, 
the content of obligations provided by international law towards state is in comparison to 
individual narrower.  
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  From the viewpoint of customary international law, the issue of primary norms 
content is fortunately absolutely clear. Position is pertinently expressed by Gaeta, who 
contends that “nobody would dare to deny that customary international law contains a 
rule prohibiting states from committing genocide.”146 Moreover, such rule attained the 
status of ius cogens. Proceedings before ICJ in Genocide Case could have been 
therefore much easier if there had been no jurisdictional constraint precluding 
application of customary international law. Jurisdictional limits nevertheless compelled 
ICJ to adopt “implication language” which was later subjected to critics mentioned 
above.  
Without any doubts, customary international law provides even for the obligation to 
prevent and repress genocidal acts.147 Here the similarity with international criminal 
law doctrine of superior responsibility is flagrant.148 ICJ confirmed accessory character 
of preventive and repressive obligation which follows only if genocide is actually 
committed,149 stressed distinct character of prevention and repression, clarified that 
content of positive obligation is bound up with conduct and not with result (i.e. state is 
obliged to use all reasonably available measures) and finally declared that state is only 
responsible if it was aware or should have been aware of serious danger of genocide.150  
The only difference between international criminal law regulation and the law of 
state responsibility rests in criterion describing the relationship to actual perpetrators. 
International criminal law rejects standard of mere influence and constantly speaks 
about effective control of superiors over inferiors, which is defined as “material ability 
to prevent or punish the commission of the offences”.151 On the other hand, ICJ 
requires mere “capacity to influence effectively the actions of persons likely to commit 
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[…] genocide.”152 Such solution is nevertheless rational – the dwell upon more 
stringent criterion of effective control would make state responsibility for failure to 
prevent and repress international crimes illusory, because its territorial scope is much 
wider (i.e. it encompasses whole territory and not only respective sphere of 
command)153 than corresponding duty of superiors under the rules of international 
criminal law. Moreover, despite similar wordings, it is clear that content of positive 
obligations need not be necessarily identical – e.g. state can be bound to adopt 
measures which can not be logically demanded on individual (passage of adequate 
legislation). State positive obligations are therefore wider both in territorial and material 
aspects.   
From above lines one can make following conclusions. As far as customary 
international law is concerned, the overlap between obligations not to commit genocide 
(negative duty) and to prevent and repress genocide (positive duty) is taken for granted 
with qualifications made thereinbefore. N. Reid stresses the importance of positive duty 
and with respect to superior responsibility speaks about the “missing link between state 
and individual responsibility under international law”.154 From the viewpoint of 
particular international law the overlap is less clear. This ambiguity does not concern 
positive duty explicitly mentioned in Genocide Convention, but deals with negative 
duty, which can be only inferred from the wording of the convention.155 If judgments of 
ICJ are accepted as legal sources enjoying high relevance in international law (despite 
the fact they have formally no binding force except between the parties and in respect 
of that particular case),156 the authoritative ruling in Genocide Case enables to speak 
about overlap between state and individual primary obligations even as regards duty not 
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to commit genocide. Such conclusion can nevertheless be subjected to critical 
evaluation.  
4.2.2 Mens rea v. Fault 
Subjective element represents important “point of contact between aggravated state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability.”157 Generally speaking, subjective 
element is to be given different meaning in international criminal law and the law of 
state responsibility. In international criminal law mens rea is fundamental and 
unsubstitutable category which has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt in every 
single criminal case. Mens rea (according to ICC Statute Article 30 either intent or 
knowledge) reflects psychological participation of perpetrator in international crime 
and is pertinent to the principle of individual responsibility bound up with international 
criminal law.158 Things are different as far as rules of state responsibility are concerned.  
“The problem […] whether the attribution of international responsibility to a State 
of an act or omission infringing an international legal obligation is conditional upon the 
fault—culpa or dolus—of the organ/organs […][is treated differently by] two main 
conflicting schools of thought—the ‘Objective Theory’ and the ‘Fault Theory’.”159 First 
approach, objective or risk theory, emphasizes concrete conduct which is to be 
compared with what should have been done under respective international legal 
obligation (i.e. accent is given on the wrongful act), second approach highlights fault of 
individual state organ, whose conduct forms basis of state responsibility and makes it 
precondition of wrongful act.160 Fault features here as additional criterion of 
international responsibility of the state. According to M. Shaw, the “relevant cases and 
academic opinions are divided on this question, although the majority tends towards the 
strict liability, objective theory of responsibility.”161 Somewhat controversial issue can 
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be moreover pragmatically resolved by so-called eclectic approach, which resigns to 
definitely resolve the position of fault in secondary rules of state responsibility and 
transfers this question to the area of primary norms.162 It seems this solution was 
endorsed even by ILC which concluded that “whether responsibility is ‘objective’ or 
‘subjective’ in this sense depends on the circumstances, including the content of the 
primary obligation in question.”163 State responsibility for genocide is therefore 
typically subjective as it demands the existence of dolus specialis. 
It is notorious that genocide comes under the rubric of so-called specific intent 
crimes (dolus specialis), whereas the psychological element is required both under 
international criminal law and the law of state responsibility.164 Briefly, specific intent 
is part of primary norms applicable to states as well as to individuals.165 Next part of 
master thesis shall analyze how genocidal dolus specialis is interpreted in both 
branches of international law and try to draw conclusion about mutual relation between 
individual and state responsibility as far as psychological element is concerned. Finally, 
focus shall be given even on psychological element required with respect to preventive 
and repressive obligation.  
It is proper to shortly mention that some scholars argue for lower psychological 
standard, connected to the so-called knowledge-based approach. Accordingly “the 
requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if the perpetrator acted in 
furtherance of a campaign targeting members of a protected group and knew that the 
goal or manifest effect of the campaign was the destruction of the group in whole or in 
part.”166 Proponents of knowledge-based approach distinguish between collective intent 
reflected by overall genocidal policy and mens rea of individual perpetrator which is 
established by mere knowledge of general context. However, this methodology has to 
be rejected. ICTY requires that every perpetrator of genocide is holder of necessary 
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specific intent.167 Such solution is to be welcomed because it best reflects gravity of 
genocide as crime of the crimes. Following analyze therefore stems from the so-called 
purpose based approach resolutely connected with intent.  
 Crucial question to answer is how to establish intent of abstract entity such as a 
state? Generally speaking, two possible models can be distinguished.168 First, state 
intent is identified with intent of responsible state organ. Such model is well known 
from domestic legal regulation of corporate responsibility, nevertheless its usage at 
international scene reveals certain disadvantages. With respect to isolated international 
crimes169 or crimes perpetrated by small groups of leaders (e.g. closed extreme form of 
dictatorship)170 such model is acceptable, on the other hand its application is much 
more difficult within systemic collective crimes (typically genocide) usually committed 
or at least tolerated by state. Who should be identified as relevant bearer of state intent 
here? To resolve this issue, the second model is available. State intent is not connected 
to the psychological category of mens rea any more, but is inferred from more objective 
indicator which is state policy. The reference can be made to report of ICID or to 
decisions of IACHR – this issue has been discussed in greater details in previous part. 
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From theoretical point of view, state intent should be more objective, i.e. it should 
not be inferred merely from internal psychological attitude of single individuals. If one 
accepts that inference of perpetrator's intent (or knowledge) from wider context, which 
is recognized in decision-practice of international criminal tribunals, makes these 
psychological category more objective, it is possible to speak about clear linkage 
between state and individual responsibility. Such line of reasoning is presented by 
Bonafé who concludes that this particular aspect “dramatically reduces the distance 
between individual criminal liability and aggravated state responsibility.”171 General 
criminal context shifts the establishment of mens rea (dolus specialis) from the 
personal conduct of the accused, from his “words and deeds and […] from patterns of 
purposeful actions”,172 to the conduct of someone else. According to ICTY Appeal 
Chamber in Krstić Case “[w]here direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the 
intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime”.173 
General criminal context is defined as encompassing among others four basic 
characteristics:174 the extent of actual destruction, the existence of genocidal plan or 
policy, perpetration and/or repetition of other destructive acts committed as part of the 
same pattern of conduct, the utterances of the accused. Prosecutor in Brdanin Case 
argued that pattern of acts committed on the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
displays the existence of genocidal intent, respectively it followed genocidal policy 
which can be used as evidence of genocidal intent - that means, the existence of 
genocidal policy was not approached as legal ingredient of genocide, but as indirect 
evidence which can prove existence of genocidal intent. ICTY rejected this argument 
ruling that in particular case widespread nature of atrocities is indeed evidence of 
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persecution, but it can not sufficiently establish the requirement of dolus specialis.175 
Interestingly, according to ICTY, “[w]here an inference needs to be drawn, it has to be 
the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.”176 Any other potential 
interpretation of indirect evidence (e.g. conclusion about commission of crimes against 
humanity) precludes conviction from genocide. Such approach has to be welcomed, 
because it corresponds with the fundamental principles of international criminal law 
based on individualization of criminal conduct, respectively it hampers needless 
profusion with the most serious criminal conviction one can imagine.177 
Standards of mens rea and fault required by ad hoc tribunals and ICJ for genocide 
conviction reveal striking similarity. It is especially evident, where dolus specialis has 
to be inferred from pattern of acts due to the lack of direct evidence.178 ICJ approach is 
as follows: 
 
The dolus specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in 
whole or in part, has to be convincingly shown by reference 
to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end 
can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern 
of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it 
would have to be such that it could only point to the existence 
of such intent.179 
 
 
Similarly with ICTY, ICJ would have accepted indirect evidence of dolus specialis 
only if any other interpretation had not been available (e.g. ethnic cleansing). Standard 
for state genocide conviction is hence as strict as in international criminal law. ICJ itself 
declared this approach when it adopted standard of proof appropriate to charges of 
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exceptional gravity.180 As ICJ highly relied on the case-law of ad hoc tribunal it is of no 
wonder that it came to the same conclusion. It is possible to formulate hypothesis that if 
ICTY in its judgments rendered before February 2007 had inferred dolus specialis from 
pattern of acts and had ruled about commission of genocide even elsewhere and not 
only in Srebrenica, ICJ would have probably adopted the same approach which would 
have been favorable for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems that state responsibility 
standard of genocidal dolus specialis is interchangeable with criterion adopted in 
international criminal law.  
This outcome was criticized by A. Abass who contends that ICJ should have 
considered the trend of ad hoc tribunals on inference of genocidal intent from 
circumstantial evidence.181 But to the knowledge of master thesis author, it is exactly 
what ICJ did using standard which, if not identical, is very similar to the criminal 
standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubts”. Despite negative appraisals presented 
soon after the Genocide Case judgment was delivered, which criticized this standard as 
unreasonably high,182 at least systematic argument and argument of judicial analogy 
speak in favor of the chosen approach. First, it has to be kept in mind that responsibility 
for genocide stems from one of the most serious wrongful act imaginable, less stringent 
criterion would made international law inconsistent, because “double standard would 
bring about the curious and undesirable result of having at the same time in 
international law a ‘crime’ of genocide alongside a ‘tort’ of genocide.”183  
Next, high standard of proof was requested by international judicial bodies even in 
less compelling accusations. A. Gattini points to the decision of 1903 UK-Venezuela 
Claim Commission184 and to the inter-state case-law of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) – in famous Ireland v. the United Kingdom Case concerned with 
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alleged torture or inhuman treatment committed by the United Kingdom during the 
Operation Demetrius in Northern Ireland, ECHR adopted the standard of proof “beyond 
reasonable doubts” but added that “such proof may follow from the coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of facts.”185 The same approach was endorsed in Cyprus v. Turkey Case, 
interestingly even with relation to violation of e.g. freedom of association, freedom of 
expression or freedom of religion.186 Briefly, mens rea and fault needed for 
establishment of individual and state responsibility for genocide reveal close contact 
between both regimes of responsibility, or at least fill up the gap between them.  
   Completely different standard is required for establishment of superior 
responsibility, respectively for state responsibility for failure to provide preventive and 
repressive measures. As far as superior responsibility is concerned, there is no need to 
prove genocidal intent187 - this form of responsibility arises where superior knew or 
should have known188 about unlawful conduct of inferiors. In the light of 
aforementioned similarity between mens rea/fault standard in genocidal special intent 
analyzed with respect to negative obligation (duty not to commit genocide), it is not 
surprising that resemblance appears even with relation to positive duty to prevent and 
repress genocide. 
Fault requirement for violation of state preventive and repressive duty is expressed 
by wording that state “was aware or should normally have been aware”189 of the serious 
danger that genocide would be committed. The existence of dolus specialis is not 
requested. It is important that ICJ adopted less demanding standard of proof as far as 
obligation to prevent is concerned, it referred to “high level of certainty”.190 In given 
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case ICJ ruled that Belgrade authorities “could hardly have been unaware of the serious 
risk of [genocide] once the VRS forces had decided to occupy the Srebrenica 
enclave.”191  
To conclude, fault requirements necessary to establish state responsibility are 
interpreted in the same way as in the area of international criminal law. Only difference 
deals with state responsibility for complicity in genocide – similarly to conduct 
requirements, fault is interpreted in narrower way. While in the area of international 
criminal law it is enough that aider or abettor was “aware of substantial likelihood that 
his acts would assist the commission of a crime by the perpetrator”,192 ICJ ruled that 
“accomplice must have given support in perpetrating the genocide with full knowledge 
of the facts.”193 If less stringent standard from international criminal law had been 
grafted into the law of state responsibility, Serbia would have been also in breach of 
complicity in genocide. It is possible to assert that in this particular area one can speak 
about differentness between state and individual responsibility,194 on the other hand ICJ 
should have dwellt upon the issue in more details and at least briefly explain, why it 
decided to divert from settled jurisprudence in international criminal law. It should be 
especially useful if the extensive adherence to ICTY work revealed in other parts of 
Genocide Case judgment is taken into account.     
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5 Conclusion 
Current public international law regulation of genocide pulls the stop195 both to the 
state and the individual, which reflects ICJ ruling that system of dual responsibility 
continues to be a constant feature of international law. Presented master thesis 
elaborated this fundamental axiom at some length considering methodological 
approach, doctrinal approach and both personal and material prerequisites of 
concurrence between state and individual responsibility for international crimes, 
respectively for genocide. 
Basic methodological delimitation revealed observation indicative of close 
relationship between state and individual conduct/responsibility whereof whole thesis is 
stemming from. Current international law is built on presumption that it is conduct of 
individual (de iure or de facto state organ) attributable to the state which forms the 
basis of state conduct. Despite some promulgation of opposite approach derived from 
sociological studies of organizations, evidenced e.g. in the report of ICID or practice of 
IACHR, from legal point of view, basis of state conduct does not rests on goal or policy 
to be pursued. In Genocide Case, ICJ considered the existence of general plan or 
pattern only as potential evidence of genocidal intent, it did not require it as condition 
included in the genocide definition.196 The same holds true in the area of international 
criminal law – state policy is approached only as indirect evidence of genocidal 
intent.197 This conclusion approximates both regimes of responsibility together from the 
very beginning and precludes assertion that state and individual responsibility grow up 
from different spawn. 
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Indication of closer relationship between both responsibilities was enunciated even 
in theoretical delimitation. The approach which would exclude possibility of 
concurrence (monistic approach) was persuasively rejected. Current doctrine of 
international law denies consideration of individual criminal responsibility as mere 
manifestation or the form of state responsibility. Right on the contrary, individual 
criminal responsibility is treated as distinct and separate institute which entered the 
scene of international law by way of “Nürnberg revolution”198 and became its integral 
part from that time. Mutual relationship between individual and state responsibility is 
best described in terms of mutual complementation which can disclose very intimate 
contact.199 Individual criminal responsibility does not exclude state responsibility and 
vice versa. Crime of genocide is exemplary example of unlawful act, which evidences 
“deep contingency”200 as dolus specialis is part of primary norms relevant both to states 
and individuals. On the other hand, majority doctrinal opinion (in the same way as 
relevant practice) rejects conclusion which would upgrade mutual relationship between 
state and individual responsibility to the higher level, it denies acceptance of formal 
dependency between them. Thus, under current international law competent tribunals 
can make a finding of genocide by a state even in absence of prior conviction of 
individual and vice versa, the lack of decision about state responsibility is not a bar for 
individual genocidal conviction.201 Opposite doctrinal opinions are marginal or relate to 
other categories of international crimes which were not treated within master thesis. 
Clearly, despite the substantial overlap between state and individual responsibility for 
genocide, potential prior convictions of individual logically can not be used to 
incriminate state and vice versa. Prior decisions have only evidentiary relevance.202 To 
give example, binding decision about state responsibility for genocide shall have no 
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connotation in the area of individual convictions, e.g. because individual may claim 
existence of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.   
In the part devoted to the work of ILC independence of both responsibility regimes 
was further confirmed. Commentaries to both codification outcomes (DASR, Code) 
reveal that ILC highlighted non-exclusive character of state and individual 
responsibility (without prejudice clauses) and principal distinction existing between 
them. ILC further expressed its understanding of criminal actions against individuals 
which it considered to be a part of primary obligations and completely marginalized 
their relevance in area of state responsibility. Validity of this conclusion can be 
demonstrated on Genocide Convention Article VI, eventually on Genocide Case203 – 
obligation to punish genocide is not a consequence of a state organ previous 
commission of genocide, i.e. non-punishment of perpetrators is regarded as separate 
violation of international law. 
Last part of master thesis evaluated prerequisites of concurrence between state and 
individual responsibility both in personal and material scope. It can be concluded that 
both personal premises and material premises reveal integrative and disintegrative 
tendencies. International criminal law evolved significantly from times of Nürnberg, 
except of post World War Two tribunals it is acknowledged that international crimes 
can be perpetrated even by private individuals, which has consequences for state 
responsibility. As described above, in such situation state would be responsible only 
indirectly for failure to adopt adequate preventive and repressive measures. Genocide 
Convention does not allow for any doubts as it expressly recognizes perpetration of 
genocide by private individuals. On the other hand, if genocide is committed by state 
organ, it has to be subsumed under the heading of public capacity what is important 
from the perspective of direct state responsibility. It was persuasively argued that 
international crimes due to their character can not be committed in private capacity. 
Finally, content of primary norms, including psychological element of mens rea and 
fault,204 was analyzed. As far as customary international law is concerned, the overlap 
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between obligation not to commit genocide (negative duty) and obligation to prevent 
and repress genocide (positive duty) was taken for granted. It was argued that the 
overlap between individual responsibility and particular state responsibility covered by 
Genocide Convention (with respect to negative obligation) depends on reading of this 
instrument. If judgments of ICJ are accepted as authoritative legal sources the ruling in 
Genocide Case enables to make affirmative conclusion about overlap between state and 
individual responsibility even in particular international law. This general conclusion 
has to be nevertheless specified. Concrete preventive steps adopted by the state (e.g. 
enactment of legislative measures) have no counterparts in the area of international 
criminal law, their nature simply precludes they are addressed to individuals. Next, it 
was mentioned that due diligence standard provided towards the state is broader as it is 
expressed by vague wording “effective influence” as opposed by “effective control” 
required by superior responsibility doctrine in international criminal law. Finally, other 
punishable acts foreseen in Genocide Convention (complicity, incitement, conspiracy) 
are interpreted differently in both areas of international law. These aspects reveal 
disintegrative tendency and enable to make conclusion that state and individual is 
responsible for violation of dissimilar primary obligations. 
As far as psychological element (dolus specialis) is concerned, fault requirements 
necessary to establish state responsibility for genocide are interpreted in the same way 
as mens rea in the area of international criminal law. It is especially evident, where 
dolus specialis has to be inferred from pattern of acts due to the lack of direct evidence, 
which shall be rather rule than exception in international practice – in such situations, 
the intent to destroy protected group as such has to be the only reasonable inference 
available. Any other potential interpretation of indirect evidence (e.g. conclusion about 
commission of crimes against humanity) precludes conviction from genocide. In 
Genocide Case ICJ heavily relied on ICTY case law which brings individualization to 
the area of state responsibility, the presumption was formulated that if ICTY in its 
judgments rendered before February 2007 had inferred dolus specialis from pattern of 
acts and had ruled about commission of genocide even elsewhere and not only in 
Srebrenica, ICJ would have probably adopted the same approach The only variation 
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from criminal law requirements deals with complicity, where ICJ opted for narrower 
standard. 
The endeavor to answer complicated question of mutual relationship between state 
and individual responsibility for genocide is enhancing task as it reflects progress made 
by international law – there are two distinct enforcement mechanisms available for 
eradication of the most serious crime imaginable. Unfortunately or fortunately, the most 
apparent link between state and individual responsibility nevertheless remains in the 
obvious legal difficulty in establishment of genocidal convictions. 
  A
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